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The Foundry: Maintaining a Double-Digit Carrier Fleet

Last week, House Armed Services’ Seapower Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) affirmed that he does not plan to include language in the FY 2009 defense authorization bill that would allow the Navy to reduce the aircraft carrier fleet below the current legal requirement of 11 carriers. According to Taylor, the Navy has a “responsibility” to fund 11 ships. With the USS Gerald R. Ford joining the fleet in 2015, the Navy has argued that the $2.2 billion it would cost to keep the aging USS Enterprise operational from 2012-2015—thus maintaining the 11 career requirement—is not worth the cost.

Congressman Taylor and other members of his Committee are correct to hold the Navy to their carrier requirement. Last month, Heritage analyst Mackenzie Eaglen and James Dolbow laid the groundwork for this argument in their Web Memo, SOS: Congress must Save the Aircraft Carrier Fleet. Eaglen also took part in a Heritage Podcast on the issue. And just last week Ed Feulner, President of The Heritage Foundation, made a similar case in the pages of the Washington Times.

During the 1980’s, the U.S. Navy had 15 aircraft carriers available to meet its Cold War responsibilities. Today that number has dipped to 11, and 10 when you factor in that one Nimitz-class carrier is undergoing lengthy Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) at all times. According to Eaglen and Dolbow, “Congress should carefully examine whether the Navy currently has enough carriers to meet the services global commitments.” After factoring in the increased operational tempo the Navy has undertaken during the Long War, its global commitment to protecting the world’s shipping lanes, and the unprecedented modernization rate of the Chinese Navy, it is clear that the current carrier fleet size is insufficient to meet the challenges at hand—much less a smaller carrier fleet.

What can be done? Eaglen, Dolbow and Feulner all argue that not only should Congress reject the Navy’s request, but they should also considering accelerating the delivery of the USS Gerald. F. Ford and hold the Navy leaders’ “feet to the fire” to ensure the goal of a 12-career fleet is met by 2019, if not sooner. Chairman Taylor is right to stand firm and maintain the size of our carrier fleet. Let’s hope that the Senate is just as committed to doing the same.

Now Blogging at An Unofficial Coast Guard Blog

I am pleased to be blogging now for An Unofficial Coast Guard Blog. I look forward to blogging about our U.S. Coast Guard as it pertains to legislative affairs, international affairs, USCG history, and Navy-Coast Guard affairs, to name a few.

Check it out at: www.cgblog.org

IWP student co-edits report on America's maritime constabulary power

"An effective maritime regime that delineates constabulary roles and missions must use all, not just some, of the instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement. It must also include dialogue and acting in concert with key stakeholders, such as:

• Friendly and allied nations, to promote common interests;• Private-sector representatives and stakeholders, to protect and facilitate legitimate commerce and other economic activities; and• Individuals, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations concerned about freedom of navigation."

That's a key assumption of a new and far-reaching report on America's maritime constabulary power co -edited by James Dolbow, a candidate for the MA in Statecraft and World Politics at The Institute of World Politics. Mr. Dolbow and his colleagues at the Heritage Foundation have written an impressive paper detailing the US Navy's roles and missions, partnerships, and fleet structure as they relate to maintaining law and order at sea, upholding laws and treaties, and protecting national interests.

SOS: Congress Must Save the Aircraft Carrier Fleet

April 2, 2008

SOS: Congress Must Save the Aircraft Carrier Fleet

by Mackenzie Eaglen and James Dolbow

WebMemo #1880

Recently, U.S. Navy leadership sent a proposal to Congress requesting waiver authority to temporarily reduce its current fleet of 11 aircraft carriers to 10 from 2012 through 2015. Congress already approved, after much deliberation, the Navy's request to reduce the fleet from 12 to 11, which resulted in the decommissioning of the John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in 2007.

Congress should reject the Navy's latest request. Today's record-low carrier force level is already a substantial reduction from the level achieved by the Reagan Administration's military buildup in the 1980s, when the Navy had set the minimum number of carriers needed to secure the high seas at 15. Congress should continue its robust support of shipbuilding and seek again to increase the shipbuilding account in this year's defense bills.

"Quantity Has a Quality All Its Own"

In 2006, Navy leaders presented a report to Congress that proposed a fleet of 313 ships, which included 11 aircraft carriers, 48 attack submarines, 88 cruisers and destroyers, 55 littoral combat ships, 31 amphibious ships, and a Maritime Prepositioning Force squadron with 12 new-construction amphibious and sealift-type ships.[1] Rebuilding a fleet that has shrunk by more than 50 percent over the past 15 years to 280 deployable ships today must remain a high priority of Navy leaders.

Unfortunately, the Navy finds itself in a not-unexpected predicament because of a 33-month gap between the decommissioning of the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and the September 2015 commissioning of the Big E's replacement, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). After a stellar 51-year career, the Enterprise's nuclear reactors will be spent dry in November 2012. Ironically, the Navy has been aware of this coming train wreck (and did nothing to mitigate it throughout this past decade) ever since leaders briefed Congress at the beginning of the millennium on future carrier force levels.

All but absent in the discussion about the Navy's inventory of aircraft carriers is the fact that over the course of the past decade--and for several more decades to follow--one Nimitz-class aircraft carrier will be undergoing a lengthy Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) at all times. A carrier undergoing an overhaul of this complexity is, for all practical purposes, not efficiently or quickly deployable. In essence, the Navy is already at a backdoor level of 10 aircraft carriers and would trend downward to nine if the Navy gets its way with Congress.

Congress must ask whether nine aircraft carriers spread thin between the global areas of responsibility of five different regional Combatant Commanders is an acceptable level of risk. The question must acknowledge that the next engagement of naval forces could involve a nation-state or a non-state actor. Congress should carefully examine whether the Navy currently has enough carriers to meet the service's global commitments. If the Navy has any difficulty meeting combatant commander requirements today, it is inevitable that a trade-off would have to occur in the event that not enough carriers are available upon request during unforeseen circumstances. The question then becomes: How can the nation not afford to maintain a minimum fleet of 11 aircraft carriers?

Margin of Risk Is Too High

The United States is a maritime nation, and the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are the pri­mary guardians of this global status. The Navy's core competencies are to maintain maritime superiority on, below, and above the high seas against all powers, including nation-states and non-state actors. If the Navy is to continue to secure the high seas around the globe long into the 21st century, it needs a robust fleet, both in the quantity of ships and in the quality of its capabilities and technologies.

Congress should reject the Navy's waiver request and instead force the Navy to come up with a plan to eliminate the carrier shortfall in 2012. If Congress is serious about the United States Navy maintaining the capability to project firepower for freedom around the globe and not following the path of the Royal Navy, it should not approve this inherently risky gamble. One option for Congress to consider is to accelerate delivery of the USS Gerald R. Ford by increasing the Navy's shipbuilding account in order to place the construction of the Ford on a wartime footing. For example, extra workers could be hired to work three shifts a day, not to mention weekends and holidays.

Congress must hold Navy leaders' feet to the fire in order to ensure that the goal of a 12-carrier fleet is achieved by 2019 (or sooner if possible). Given the Navy's tendencies and zeal to retire ships early--ships like Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Los Angeles-class attack submarines--Congress should enact into law an additional requirement that all Nimitz-class carriers be refueled. This requirement would preempt officials at the Office of Management and Budget from eyeing the elimination of RCOHs for purposes of imaginary budgetary savings. Furthermore, the Navy must resist cannibalizing shipbuilding funds for other more urgent priorities if the 313-ship fleet is ever to become a reality.

Overall, preserving the shipbuilding program will likely require Congress to continue to increase the Navy's procurement budget as it has loyally done so many times over the last several years. There is little as powerful in the military inventory as 4.5 acres of sovereign U.S. territory that is used to counter and deter threats. In addition to the traditional carrier strike missions, CVNs could be used for expeditionary sea-based platforms for soldiers and marines.

Conclusion

Congress should not "go wobbly" on the Navy's request for a waiver from the requirement in 10 USC §5062 that it maintain an aircraft carrier force of at least 11 operational ships. Financing the future Navy fleet is a common-sense necessity for a maritime power.

A robust shipbuilding budget for the next 10 to 20 years is necessary in order to reverse the decline in the number of ships in the Navy's inven­tory. Failure in this regard will only embolden U.S. adversaries. The carrier shortfall is another perilous reminder that the defense budget topline is too low for the U.S. military to simultaneously field trained and ready forces, support ongoing operations, and modernize. Congress should commit now to spending 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense in part to meet the military's immediate modernization needs, including its carrier fleet.

Mackenzie M. Eaglen is Senior Policy Analyst for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Jim Dolbow is an M.A. candidate in Statecraft and World Politics at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C.

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[1]Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated June 12, 2007, p. 5.

Securing the High Seas: America's Global Maritime Constabulary Power

March 12, 2008
Securing the High Seas: America's Global Maritime Constabulary Power
by Mackenzie Eaglen, James Dolbow, Martin Edwin Andersen and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
Special Report #20

Introduction

This is the third in a series of reports on maritime security prepared by The Heritage Foundation's Maritime Security Working Group. This report addresses how to provide operational recommendations to the group's previ­ous proposals while making the case that the United States, with its regional allies, must develop the capacity to exer­cise "global maritime constabulary power."

Specifically, this report:

• Defines global maritime constabulary power;
• Identifies the roles and missions that are related to global maritime constabulary power;
• Describes the role of friendly and allied nations;
• Suggests how the private sector can and should contribute;
• Recommends a division of responsibilities for maritime constabulary duties between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard; and
• Identifies the budgetary, regulatory, and legislative implications of the recommendations.

The Heritage Foundation's Maritime Security Working Group was tasked to produce cutting-edge policy rec­ommendations for making the seas safer for the United States, its friends and allies, and global commerce. In its pre­vious two reports, the group—composed of representatives from academia, the private sector, research institutions, and government—addressed some of the most pressing issues confronting maritime security.

In 2005, in its first report, "Making the Sea Safer: A National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counterterror­ism,"[1] the group outlined the future threats to and gaps in U.S. maritime security. Rather than focus on episodic, short-term issues like inspecting containers, the group offered a broader and more thoughtful assessment of the mar­itime challenges facing the United States, including:

• Dependence on maritime trade. Maritime commerce will be an increasingly important component of the global economy. Modern maritime commerce is generally defined by large, containerized shipping moving through megaports, which form the backbone of just-in-time international trade.
• The economic impact of security in the developing world. Developing countries may find it increas­ingly difficult to meet the demands of international security regimes for trade and travel. If this occurs, these relatively weaker economies may become less competitive in global markets.
• Undersea infrastructure. Undersea critical infrastructure, such as oil and gas pumping stations and telecommunications cables, are fast becoming an increasingly important part of the global economy.
• The potential for standoff attacks from sea. State and non-state actors will be capable of attacking the U.S. from their own territorial waters using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), short-range ballistic mis­siles, and cruise missiles, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The group also rec­ognized that terrorists could use small boats packed with explosives, as was done in the attack on the USS Cole, and employ floating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or naval mines against commercial shipping in U.S. waters and overseas ports.
• The lack of visibility in noncommercial maritime activity. Currently, the United States lacks suffi­cient means to monitor maritime activity. Terrorists could exploit this failing in many ways, such as by using naval mines and other means to launch underwater attacks and using private craft to smuggle small payloads into the U.S. outside of ports and to attack targets in U.S. waters.
• Maritime criminal activity. Piracy, human trafficking, and drug and arms smuggling will continue. Ter­rorists could mimic or partner with criminal enterprises.
• Internal threats from rogue actors and landside attacks. The greatest vulnerability to maritime infra­structure may be internal threats. These include disgruntled employees who have an intimate knowl­edge of operations and facilities with access to transportation and port assets.
• The maritime domain as a target and facilitator of threats against the environment. Opportunities for the spread of infectious disease and other environmental threats carried by seaborne traffic will increase as maritime commerce increases.
• Anti-access strategies. An enemy might attack vulnerable targets on U.S. territory as a means to coerce, deter, or defeat the United States.

Overall, the report argued for a comprehensive, strategic approach to making the seas safer, rejecting simplistic security proposals that focus on inspecting containers and handing out federal port security grants.

In 2006, the working group's second report, "Trade Security at Sea: Setting National Priorities for Safeguarding America's Economic Lifeline,"[2] made the case that, based on the nature of existing and emerging threats, the United States' highest priority in maritime security should be ensuring the resiliency of global maritime commerce, thereby ensuring unimpeded trade and travel, regardless of what terrorists might attempt in the maritime environment. In order to protect maritime trade, the working group focused on three essential enablers:

• Expanding the capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard by fully funding Coast Guard modernization and ensuring that the service has the resources to perform all of its missions,
• Improving the sharing and use of commercial information, and
• Enhancing international cooperation.

This report looks in greater detail at providing the enforcement tools for making the seas safer. The principal rec­ommendations include:

• Doubling the U.S. Coast Guard's active and reserve end strength over the next decade and accelerating Coast Guard modernization;
• Expanding the Navy's stated goal of 313 ships by an additional 37 ships (the preponderance of which should be nuclear powered, including additional nuclear-powered submarines) and focusing Navy operations more on sea control and assured access and less on maritime engagement and security missions; and
• Establishing a Common Maritime Security Fleet Fund to bolster modernization.

[1] James Jay Carafano and Alane Kochems, eds., "Making the Sea Safer: A National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counterterrorism," Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 3, February 17, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/74871_4.pdf.
[2] James Jay Carafano and Martin Edwin Andersen, "Trade Security at Sea: Setting National Priorities for Safeguarding America's Economic Lifeline," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1930, April 27, 2007, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg1930.cfm.

Naval Institute publishes student's essay on medical diplomacy

"Each one of the Department of Defense's five regional combatant commands should have three hospital ships permanently assigned to their respective areas of responsibility." That's what IWP MA degree candidate Lt. Jim Dolbow USCGR argues in an article published in the February 2008 edition of the US Naval Institute's Proceedings magazine.
Dolbow maintains that the United States can easily build on the success of its two current hospital ships in providing medical care and disaster relief around the world -- a form of medical diplomacy that can play a vital part in winning the hearts and minds of America's foes. As he points out, "There's no shortage of hearts and minds to win."